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Econ Seminar:Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information
AbstractThis paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite on infinite horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e. almost perfect information), and (2) the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in perfect-information dynamic games with uncertainty. Our results go beyond previous works on continuous dynamic games in the sense that public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. As an illustrative application, an example on the dynamic stochastic oligopoly market is considered.
When 22 March 2017 15:30 - 17:00
Where LSK6045
Speaker(s) Professor Wei He
Contact Julie tel: 2358 7621 / email: fnjuwong@ust.hk
Payment Free []
Audience Faculty / Staff,Students,Alumni / Friends
Website http://home.ust.hk/~fnjuwong/seminar/HKUST.htm
Language English
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